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Abstract 
Where  a  fish  stock  straddles  or  migrates  between  country  A’s  exclusive  economic  zone 
(EEZ) and country B’s EEZ, or the high seas, vesting ownership rights in the stock with A 
does not ensure efficient harvesting of the stock. This problem arises in the case of migratory 
tuna stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). Four species of tuna reside 
for only part of the year in the EEZs of coastal states, many of which are Pacific Island 
Countries (PICs). Most of the harvesting of the stocks is carried out by distant water fishing 
nations such as the USA, Japan, Taiwan, China and Korea. 
 
Problems arise for achieving efficiency and equity in the harvesting of the stocks by disparate 
countries. The problems are made more difficult by changes in the harvesting levels of one 
fleet affecting the rents of another fleet through changes in the age distribution of stock. 
These  types  of  problem  are  under  review  by  the  Western  and  Central  Pacific  Fisheries 
Commission,  formed  in  2005.  Results  from  an  age-structured  steady-state  bioeconomic 
model are used to show: the changes in fleet rents and catches of tuna if all fleets form a 
cooperative grand coalition to deploy fishing effort to maximize rents over the WCPO; the 
likely non-stability of the grand coalition; and the inferior Nash Equilibrium outcomes if all 
fleets fish non-cooperatively to maximize their own rents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The tuna fishery in the western and central Pacific is conducted by fleets from many different 
nations. Traditionally fishing in this area was mainly done by the Japanese, who fished with 
longline or pole and line. Over time new nations, especially Taiwan and Korea, emerged in 
the  longline  fishery.  Furthermore,  from  the  1970s  on,  fishing  by  purse  seine  increased 
rapidly. Purse seining is carried out by a variety of nations: the United States, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and the Pacific island nations, in addition to those involved in longlining. 
 
When fishing fleets from different nations compete for a common fish stock, the result is 
likely to be overexploitation, both in the biological and the economic sense. The life span of 
tuna is several  years,  in which case biological overexploitation means that most fish are 
caught too young, before they have reached the age of maximum age group biomass. In 
addition, recruitment of young fish may be adversely affected by reducing the spawning stock 
too far, but little is known about the relationship between the spawning stock biomass and 
recruitment to the stock. In economic terms overexploitation means that there are too many 
fishermen and boats, raising the fishing costs to an unnecessarily high level. 
 
An additional aspect  of the possible economic overexploitation of the tuna  stocks in  the 
western and central Pacific is the effect of purse seining on the longline fishery. Purse seine 
fishing is carried out primarily for skipjack tuna, but also for yellowfin, and some bigeye tuna 
also get entangled in the seines. The catching of yellowfin and bigeye tuna has a detrimental 
effect on the longline fishery, because the purse seiners primarily take young tuna which 
would  otherwise  have  grown  older  and  become  available  for  the  longline  fishery.  The 
question therefore arises whether reducing the purse seine fishery for bigeye and yellowfin 
would be advisable. Do these fish represent a higher value if left for the longline fishery, or 
had they better be taken by the purse seine fishery? 
 
In this paper we shall look at the interaction between the purse seine fishery and the longline 
fishery. Would it make sense, from an overall point of view, to reduce the former for the 
benefit of the latter? This is a part of the larger issue of what rate and pattern of exploitation 
would  maximize  the  economic  rent  in  the  fishery.  Which  fleet  should  participate  in  the 
fishery and on what scale? Given that such a solution would most likely entail some fleets 
fishing less than presently or not at all, could such a solution be implemented by some kind of 
rent sharing? And if not, or if a rent-maximizing solution is unlikely to be implemented for 
other reasons, what kind of outcome can we expect when all national fleets compete against 
each other? These are the types of question being raised by the recently established Western 
and  Central Pacific Fisheries Commission  (see Kennedy, 2006), and that we shall try to 
answer in this paper. 
 
We shall consider three stocks that are likely to be, to a greater or lesser degree, mixed in the 
fishing areas and hence fished to some extent indiscriminately by the fishing fleets. These are 
bigeye,  yellowfin  and  skipjack.  Both  are  found  mainly  in  the  tropical  areas  between  10 
degrees north and south of the equator. Albacore tuna, also fished in the western and central 
Pacific, is mainly found further south and therefore to a lesser extent fished indiscriminately 























































Figure 1: Catches of tuna in the Western and central Pacific (source: WCPFC Tuna Fisheries  
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The question of maximizing rents in the western and central Pacific tuna fishery has been 
analysed before. Bertignac and others (2001) used a detailed age structured model with a 
number of different fleets to look into the effects of changing the size of different fleets. They 
calculated the rent gains versus losses from changing fishing effort for the different fleets and 
the interaction between different fleets for the different stocks involved. The emphasis here is 
somewhat different. We look not just at the rent-maximizing solution, but also at whether 
under ideal circumstances a grand, rent-maximizing coalition is likely to be stable, and what 
would be the outcome of competition among the fleets of the various nations participating in 
the fishery. For this reason a simpler model of the tuna stocks than the one used by Bertignac 
et  al.  (2001),  which  is  highly  disaggregated  spatially  and  allows  for  average  rates  of 
advection and diffusion of stock between the 5 degree squares making up the western and 
central Pacific region. When possible data from the disaggregated model are used in the 
much simpler highly aggregated model, but some of the model changes lead to requirements 
for different parameter estimates. The way in which some parameters were tuned to obtain 





The model employed is a yield per recruit model. Each age interval is one quarter. Growth, 
natural mortality and gear selectivity parameters were taken from the WCPOBTM-model 
(Reid et al., 2006). 
 
Two fisheries are considered, the purse seine fishery and the longline fishery. These are the 
dominating types of gear nowadays, while earlier pole and line in particular was important. 
The pole and line fishery is included with the purse seine fishery, as the selectivity patterns 
for both gear types are identical for bigeye and yellowfin tuna. In addition, there are other 
fisheries, of which domestic Indonesian and Philippine fisheries are important components. 
We will not consider these fisheries any further, except including them as a residual fishery 
with a constant fishing mortality. 
  
Figure 1 shows the tuna catches in the western and central Pacific since 1950. Except for 
albacore, the total catches have increased in an almost linear fashion. Since the 1990s most of 
the skipjack has been taken by purse seines. This is true to a lesser extent for yellowfin, of 
which substantial catches are taken by longlines. Most of the bigeye is taken by longlines, but 
there is a non-negligible catch by purse seines, which is on the rise. The use of pole and line 
is in decline.  
 
For modelling purposes, a steady state age-structured stock system is simulated as follows. 
Stock in each age category is reduced over each quarterly fishing season by natural mortality 
and fishing mortality set by harvesting effort. Stock in the first age category is replenished in 
each  quarter  at a  constant  rate  of  recruitment. This  is  a  simplification  to  the  extent that 
recruitment is here not a function of the adult biomass of the stock. As numbers decline in 
older age categories, the effect on biomass is to some degree offset by the increasing average 
unit weight of the stock. 
   5 
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with  . , i s i i s s f q s E = , and where  , r s x is recruitment numbers into the first age category,  , i s f and 
, i s m are the  quarterly  instantaneous  rates  of  fishing  (aggregated  across fleets)  and  natural 
mortality respectively,  ,  and  s i s q s are availability and selectivity coefficients respectively, and 
s e is quarterly fishing effort. 
 
Catch  for  species  s  accumulates  from  each  age  category  over  the  season,  dependent  on 
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where  , i s w is the average unit catch weight of fish in the i-th age category. 
 
The model is not dynamic in that the decision variables  , i s f remain the same for all quarterly 
time periods. However, this enables the impact of changes in  , i s f  on steady state stocks, 
catches and rents to be readily determined by iterating to the steady state. 
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With given age-specific weight, natural mortality and selectivity, it is possible to tune the 
model by finding the fishing mortalities that reproduce the catches taken by the three types of 
gear in some reference year. This was done for the catches taken in 2005, but the resulting 
fishing mortalities produced much too low survival rates for all three stocks (less than one 
percent for all stocks at what the WCPOBTM model considers the terminal age). This implies 
a  severe  overexploitation  of  all  three  stocks,  which  in  turn  implies  enormous  and  in  all 
probability unrealistic gains from reducing fishing effort and fishing mortalities. 
 
Instead, the model was tuned by basing the availability coefficients ( s q ) on those used in the 
WCPOBTM model and finding the effort levels that most successfully reproduce the catch 
shares taken by the main fleets in 2005, whereafter the initial recruitment to each stock was   6 
determined by setting the catch produced by the model equal to the total catch in 2005.
1 
Table 1 shows the fleets identified for the purpose of this study and the catches taken of 
bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack in 2005, and Figure 2 the actual catches of the fleets in 2005 
and the catches implied by the said procedure. 
 
A further reality check of the parameters is provided by looking at the survival rate of fish in 
the three stocks resulting from the effort produced by this procedure. In the WCPOBTM 
model the life-span of fish in the three stocks is set at 32 quarters for bigeye (8 years), 22 for 
yellowfin (5.5 years), and 16 for skipjack (4 years). The implication is that few fish survive to 
this age. With the effort set as explained above, about six percent of each age group survives 
to  the  said  ages.  This  is  probably  realistic;  according  to  Hampton  et  al.  (2006a,  b),  a 
significant number of bigeye survive to the age of eight years, and a significant number of 
yellowfin to the age of four, according to tagging experiments. With the parameters above, 11 
percent of yellowfin survive until the age of four. Whether or not six and 11 percent is 
significant  can  be  debated,  but  a  lower  survival  rate  implies  overexploitation  and  much 
greater gains from reducing fishing effort than this tuning of the model gives rise to. 
 
Table 1: Catches of tuna (thousand tonnes) in 2005 in the western and central Pacific by fleet 











Source: Secretariat of the Pacific Community: Tuna Yearbook 2005. 
 
The model used here, as well as the WCPOBTM model, imply non-selective fishing with 
respect  to  stocks;  once  the  gear  has  been  set  the  fixed  availability  coefficients  and  the 
abundance of the stocks determine how much will be caught from each stock. Technically 
this means that any given effort by the k-th fleet of purse seiners or longliners will produce 
fishing mortalities for the three stocks according to the relationship  , , , , , . i s k s k i s k k f q s E =  Model 
availability  and selectivity coefficients are given in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. 
 
The different national fleets have different qi’s, as their catch shares differ between stocks. 
The differences in the qi’s indicate that a total absence of selectivity between stocks is not 
quite true, although it may be due to different fleets fishing in different areas rather than 
targeting certain stocks, except indirectly by fishing in certain areas rather than others. 
                                                
1 The WCPOBTM model identifies two different long line fleets, one for frozen and one for fresh tuna. We have 
used the q’s for fresh tuna, except for Korea, which is not represented with a fleet for fresh tuna in the model. 
For Korea we used the same q as for Japan. For fisheries other than purse seining and longlining the fishing 
mortality was determined for each stock separately by reproducing the catches in these fisheries. The selectivity 
pattern for the Indonesian domestic fisheries was used, but this fishery, as well as the Philippine domestic 
fishery (which has a somewhat different selectivity pattern) is an important part of these other fisheries. 
Purse seine (including pole and line)    Longline 
    Bigeye  Yellowfin  Skipjack        Bigeye  Yellowfin  Skipjack 
US    4.8  17.0  52.4    China    30.4  15.7  0.1 
Japan    8.1  29.3  327.1    Japan    15.3  20.2  3.5 
Korea    2.6  35.6  171.6    Korea    6.4  2.4  0.0 
Taiwan    2.2  27.6  165.3    Taiwan    15.6  13.3  0.0 
Others    17.2  52.4  354.3    Others    17.2  22.9  1.5 
Pacific Islands    16.0  72.9  311.0             



























































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Actual and simulated catches of tuna for 12 fleets.  
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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 
For economic analysis, it is necessary to determine the cost per unit of effort for the different 
fleets. As a point of departure we use the cost parameters of the WCPOBTM model, but this 
is not unproblematic, as our model excludes one of the stocks included in the WCPOBTM 
model.  Furthermore  we  have  calculated  the  effort  levels  for  the  different  fleets  by 
reproducing the 2005 catches in the best possible way rather than using actual effort data for 
the different fleets. Since the cost figures of the WCPOBTM model presumably reflect the 
best estimates of the cost differences between the different fleets we deal with this by scaling 
all the cost figures by the same factor so that a reasonable rent is produced for the different 
fisheries. As to prices, these are fixed and equal to unity for the purse seine fishery, but 10 
and  6,  respectively,  for  bigeye  tuna  and  yellowfin  tuna  caught  with  longline.  This  price 
difference is set on the basis of Bertignac et al. (2001), which reported price differentials of 
approximately this magnitude between the purse seine and the longline fishery. 
 
 
A reference solution 
 
The rent resulting from using the 2005 catches as a reference solution is shown in Table 2. 
The US purse seine fleet breaks even, and long lining by Others returns a small loss. For the 
remaining  fleets  we  get  positive  and  quite  possibly  unrealistically  high  rents;  China and 
Taiwan produce a rent of over 30 percent of production value, Japan about 26 in the longline 
fishery and 10 in the purse seine fishery, and Korea about 20 percent in the longline fishery 
and 16 in the purse seine fishery. The Pacific island countries get a rent of 7 percent in their 
purse seine fisheries. Since the distant water fishing fleets pay fees for access to the economic 
zones of the Pacific island nations, it is reasonable to expect some rents in these fisheries, for 
otherwise the boatowners would be making a capital loss and would not renew their boats 
when they are worn out. These access fees are only 3-4 percent of revenues (Petersen, 2002),  
however, while the rents in Table 2 are much higher than needed for that, except for the US 
fleet, which just breaks even. There is reason to expect, therefore, that the cost of the US fleet 
is lower than assumed here, a point we will return to below. 
 







Table 3 compares the solution maximizing aggregate rents and the reference solution. In the 
rent-maximizing exercise, the mortality in the other fisheries is held constant, and they are 
not  a  part  of  the  rent  maximization.  The  aggregate  rent  is  the  maximum,  undiscounted, 
sustainable rent, as the model is a static yield per recruit model that compares different long 
term equilibrium solutions, but including the dynamics between age groups. There is a large 
reduction in fishing mortality in the purse seine fishery while the mortality in the longline 
fishery increases by 150-160 percent. As a result, purse seine catches of bigeye and yellowfin 
Purse seine; Pole & line    Longline 
US  Japan  Korea  Taiwan  Others    PICs  Japan  Taiwan  China  Korea  Others 
0.0  10.5  16.4  32.1  27.2    7.0  26.6  34.5  34.3  21.9  -1.3   10 
decrease by about 70 and 30 percent, respectively, while the decrease in the catch of skipjack 
is relatively limited, or about 10 percent. Longline catches of bigeye and yellowfin more than 
double. The rent increases in both fisheries; as a percent of revenue it nearly doubles in the 
purse seine fishery (total revenue declines), and in the longline fishery it increases from about 
20 to 30 percent of revenue. These increases in rent are in part due to the exclusion of high 
cost fleets; the only fleet active in the purse seine fishery is Taiwan while both Taiwan and 
China are active in the longline fishery. 
 
 




It is noteworthy that both the purse seine fishery and the longline fishery appear in the rent-
maximizing  solution.  It  would  not  have  been  unexpected  if  the  purse  seine  fishery  had 
disappeared  altogether,  the  reason  being  that  each  fleet  fishes  all  three  species 
indiscriminately.  The  longline  fishery  obtains  much  higher  prices  for  its  product,  and  it 
makes sense to limit the purse seine fishery for the benefit of the longline fishery, unless the 
costs in the longline fishery are high enough to make up for the price difference. This is what 
happens in the rent-maximizing solution, as we have seen; the fishing mortality in the purse 
seine fishery goes down and increases in the longline fishery. But the reduction of effort in 
the purse seine fishery is bound to also hit the skipjack fishery, because of the indiscriminate 
fishing  of  all  three  stocks, even  if  there  is  no  longline  fishery  for  skipjack.
2  Letting  the 
Taiwanese fleet fish do the purse seining achieves a judicious compromise; it turns out that 
the selectivity of the Taiwanese purse seiners is such as to take relatively little of bigeye and 
yellowfin  compared  to  skipjack.  Figure  3  shows  the  selectivity  pattern  for  bigeye  and 
yellowfin of the six purse seine fleets in the model, relative to skipjack. 
 
As already indicated, the advantage of the longline fleet is due to the higher prices obtained 
for the fish it catches, which goes to the Japanese sashimi market. There is good reason to 
expect the price of fish sold into that market to decline the more fish that is supplied; this was 
one of things analysed by Bertignac et al. (2001). We shall not here consider the elasticity of 
                                                
2 In reality there is some long line fishing for skipjack, as can be seen from Figure 1, but it is very small and has 
been ignored here for simplicity. 
Species    Purse seine    Longline 
    Reference  Rent max  Change (%)    Reference  Rent max  Change (%) 
    f    f 
Bigeye    0.046  0.012  -73.8    0.008  0.020  146.2 
Yellowfin    0.025  0.018  -28.0    0.003  0.007  160.9 
Skipjack    0.031  0.028  -9.9    0  0    
    Catch    Catch 
Bigeye    43.2  10.4  -75.8    87.4  199.1  127.9 
Yellowfin    244.8  174.8  -28.6    65.3  168.5  157.9 
Skipjack    1385.8  1267.5  -8.5    0  0    
    Rent    Rent 
All    283.2  478.2  68.8    265.1  921.9  247.8 
    Rent as % of revenue    Rent as % of revenue 
All    16.9  32.9      20.9  30.7   
    Fleets active    Fleets active 
    All  Taiwan    All  Taiwan, China   11 
demand in the Japanese sashimi market, but instead investigate by how much the price of fish 
in the longline fishery would have to fall to make this fishery unprofitable, from the point of 
view of maximizing aggregate rents. If the price advantage of the longline fishery is reduced 
by 40 percent, the Taiwanese longline fleet disappears from the rent-maximizing solution, 
and only the Chinese fleet is left. If the price advantage for the longline fleet falls by 50 
















Figure 3: Selectivity of the six purse seine fleets. 
 
 
How would a revenue-maximizing solution differ from the rent-maximizing solution? This is 
interesting, because if there is no stock effect (i.e., the catch per unit of effort is constant and 
independent of the stock size), the cost per unit of fish caught a constant. This means that the 
revenue-maximizing solution would be identical to the rent-maximizing solution for cases 
where tuna prices are the same as unit tuna rents . This solution is not radically different from 
the rent-maximizing solution already discussed; the Taiwanese purse seiners would still be 
the only ones fishing and would do so on a greater scale, and the fishing mortality in the 
longline fishery would be much higher, with the fishing being done by the most cost-efficient 
fleet. One might have suspected that the fishing mortality would become infinitely large in 
this  solution.  This  can  easily  happen  in  models  like  this  with  a  fixed  price,  unless  the 
selectivity pattern is such that fishing with high intensity would deplete the age groups well 
before they have reached the maximum biomass weight.  
   12 
Stability of the grand coalition 
 
Solutions like the rent-maximizing solution above are none too likely to be attained. They 
imply that the most efficient fleets should do the fishing and the others disappear, with the 
latter being compensated by a share in the greater profit. Such grand coalitions are sometimes 
not viable even in principle, as there may be incentives for some members of the coalition to 
break out and form their own sub-coalition, either with themselves as a single member or 
with more, but not all, members. See Kennedy (2003) for consideration of solution concepts, 
with and without side-payments, and allocations to indicate the security of coalitions. 
 
The nature of the rent  k π accruing to the k-th fleet breaking out can be explained as follows. 
The k-th one-member coalition (i.e., fleet) acts as a leader and solves the problem:  
 
  max { | }
k
k k π 0 f
f x   (4) 
 
where  k π is the rent generated, k f are the fishing mortalities set and  0 x is the array of stock 





k f denote the solution to (4). The remaining fleets indexed by j act together as a group 
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This is one thing that could threaten the grand coalition implied by the rent-maximizing 
solution. Each country would have to be offered an outcome at least as good as the country 
could obtain if it decided to break out of the coalition and maximize its own rent. Table 4 
shows that the sum of what the individual countries could obtain from a one-country coalition 
is greater than the maximal rent.
3 Looked at in another way, suppose it is agreed that a 
nation’s  fair  share  of  the  rent  is  determined  by  its  contribution  to  making  the  coalition 
complete. The column “fair” rent share in Table 4 shows what each nation would then get. 
With these payments, in this case, all fleets would gain more by going it alone than by 
accepting their “fair” share. To this extent the grand coalition is unstable. This will be the 
case whenever the total of leader rents exceeds max rent. 
 
 
                                                
3 The US and “others” are not represented in the table because the profitability of their fisheries in the reference 
solution is marginal or sub-marginal, and they drop out of the coalition game.   13 
Table 4: Rent obtained by a one-member coalition and a “fair” share for the individual 
countries. 
 
Each fleet considers acting first to maximise its 
rent, leaving the rest to maximise their joint rent 
  Leader fleet rent    “Fair” rent share 
of Max rent 
Japan    145.5    141.6 
Korea    153.1    149.0 
Taiwan    822.5    800.4 
PICs    24.6    23.9 
China    293.0    285.1 
Total    1438.7    1400.1 
All fleets act to maximise joint rent cooperatively         
Max rent    1400.1     
 
There are conditions, however, under which this coalition would nevertheless be stable. This 
occurs if all countries realize that if one of them breaks out, all the others would do likewise. 
What then is  important  to  look  at is  the  temporary  gain  one  country  might  obtain  from 
breaking out of the coalition less the present value of the discounted loss resulting from 
everyone else going for the Nash equilibrium solution. The outcome of this depends on the 
discount rate and would require an intertemporal model to analyse (Hannesson, 1997).  
 
 
The Nash equilibrium 
 
Given that a grand coalition is none too likely, it makes sense to look at a solution where 
everyone is competing against everyone else, i.e., a Nash equilibrium with seven participants, 
the participants being defined as the five countries US, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and China, 
plus the Pacific island countries as one player, and all others as the seventh player.  
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  (6) 
 
Table 5 compares the Nash equilibrium with the reference solution. The US, Japan and the 
Pacific  island  countries  drop  out  of  purse  seining,  and  Korea  and  Others  drop  out  of 
longlining. Japan reduces its longlining by 20 percent but loses almost all its rent from the 
fishery. Korea increases its purse seining by 30 percent, but loses more than 80 percent of its 
rents. Others expand their activities in purse seining and increase their rents by almost 60 
percent, but drop out of longlining, where they operated with a loss in the reference solution. 
Taiwan expands its activities in purse seining and longlining six- to sevenfold and increases 
its rents in the purse seine fishery by 300 percent and doubles its rents in the longline fishery. 
China  expands  its  efforts  in  the  longline  fishery  16-fold  and  increases  its  rents  by  400 
percent. The total rent is only a half of what it is in the rent-maximizing solution, but actually 
three times higher than in the reference solution. 
   14 
Table 5: Effort in the Nash equilibrium, relative to the reference solution, and percentage 




More realistic costs? 
 
This Nash equilibrium looks suspicious; one would expect this to be the bottom line below 
which we would not be likely to fall. Some fleets, such as US purse seiners, purse seiners 
from  the  Pacific  island  countries,  and  Korean  and  Others’  longliners,  are  conspicuously 
absent from the Nash equilibrium. One suspects that this could be due to the costs for these 
fleets being set too high. Let us therefore look at a solution where the cost per unit of effort 
has been reduced to allow these fleets (except for Others’ longliners) to appear in the Nash 
equilibrium solution. The result is summarized in Table 6. With the cost per unit of effort 
being reduced by 20 percent for purse seiners from the US and the Pacific island countries, 
and Korean longliners, these fleets are now represented in the solution. A cost reduction of 30 
percent for Others’ longliners was not enough, however, for this fleet to appear in the Nash 
equilibrium solution. 
 
Table 6: Nash equilibrium compared with the reference solution, with changed cost per unit 
of effort. Percentage change in cost per unit of effort (US, PICs, and Korean longliners: 20 
percent; Japanese longliners: 10 percent; other longliners: 30 percent). 
 
We now make comparisons with the reference solution and the rent-maximizing solution, 
given these new costs. The effort by the US fleet increases by 30 percent compared with the 
reference solution, but the rent almost disappears. Purse seining both by the Pacific island 
countries and Others is increased more than two and a half times, but rents fall by 30 and 18 
percent, respectively. Taiwan increases its longlining almost threefold and its purse seining 
more than eightfold, increasing  rents in purse seining by 260  percent while they fall by 
almost 70 percent in longlining. Korea increases its longlining almost fivefold, but rents fall 
by 17 percent. China increases its longlining more than sixfold, but rents fall by 35 percent. 
In this case the Nash equilibrium results in about 40 percent lower rents than the reference 
solution, and about 60 percent lower rents than the rent-maximizing solution. 
 
The rent-maximizing solution differs from the previous one in that more longline fleets now 
are represented. In the previous one only Taiwan and China were represented, but now also 
Korea and Others are included. Japanese costs are still too high. Still it is only Taiwan that 
does the purse seining, on about the same scale as before.  
 
  Purse seine; and Pole & line    Longline 
  US  Japan  Korea  Taiwan  Others  PICs    Japan  Taiwan  China  Korea  Others 
                         
Effort  0  0  1.3  7.2  3.5  0    0.8  6.4  16.4  0  0 
Rent, % change  100            -100  -84.7  304.0  57.5  -100    -91.2  92.2  402.3  -100  100 
  Purse seine; and Pole & line    Longline 
  US  Japan  Korea  Taiwan  Others  PICs    Japan  Taiwan  China  Korea  Others 
                         
Effort  1.3  0  0  8.2  2.6  2.6    1.0  2.7  6.2  4.7  0 




This paper has shown that considerable, but not dramatic, increases in rent can be obtained 
from changing the tuna fishery from its present configuration. Two changes are involved. 
First, purse seining should be reduced drastically, for the benefit of the longline fishery, 
which delivers a more valuable product. The price advantage of the longline fishery would 
have to be reduced by a half to overturn this conclusion. 
 
Second, provided there is a mechanism to share the aggregate rent, the fishing should be 
carried out by the most cost-effective fleets. This means that some fleets would disappear 
altogether,  with the nations involved  getting a share  of the total  rent. There are obvious 
practical and political obstacles to such a solution; how long would a country without any 
fishing fleet of its own be considered entitled to a share in the rents of a fishery taking place 
hundreds of miles away from its economic zone? Apart from that, in this particular setting 
this kind of solution would probably not be stable; there is no way that all countries can be 
offered rent shares that exceed what they could get on their own if one breaks out of the 
coalition and the others stay in it. Only if they realize that a breakdown of the coalition would 
end in everybody competing against everyone else and that the gains from breaking away 
would be temporary could the grand coalition be viable. 
 
Furthermore, the result that only the Taiwanese fleet remains in the purse seine fishery in the 
rent-maximizing solution illustrates that the purse seine fishery should be cut back in a way 
that minimizes the impact on the skipjack fishery and maximizes the impact on the yellowfin 
and especially the bigeye stocks. To the extent it is possible for the purse seine fishery to 
selectively fish the different stocks they should go for the skipjack and leave the yellowfin 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Availability coefficients  , s k q by species s and fleet k 
(All to 3 significant figures) 
 
   Purse seine and Pole & line 
  US  Japan   Korea   Taiwan   PICs  Others 
Bigeye  0.003300  0.001120  0.000361  0.000315  0.000645  0.001650 
Yellowfin  0.000508  0.000647 0.000595  0.000465 0.000401  0.000429 
Skipjack  0.000772  0.000940 0.000887  0.000798  0.000623  0.000319 
           
   Longline   
  China   Japan   Korea   Taiwan   Others   
Bigeye  0.000002190 0.000003010 0.000003010 0.000002250 0.000001210  
Yellowfin  0.000000557 0.000000616 0.000000216 0.000000953 0.000000780  




 Table A2: Selectivity coefficients  , , i s k s by age i, species s and fleet k  
 
 
          Skipjack       
     Selectivity coefficients for first quarter of each year class 
      1  5  9  13       
Purse seiners, all fleets  0.002  0.631  0.386  0.630       
Pole and line, all fleets    0.000  0.315  0.529  0.722       
                   
Longline, frozen and fresh, all fleets  0.001  0.007  0.222  0.995       
                   
                   
          Yellowfin       
     Selectivity coefficients for first quarter of each year class 
      1  5  9  13  17     
Purse seiners, all fleets  0.027  0.428  0.467  0.326  0.382     
Pole and line, all fleets    0.027  0.428  0.467  0.326  0.382     
                   
Longline, frozen and fresh, all fleets  0.004  0.047  0.941  0.993  0.999     
                   
                   
          Bigeye       
     Selectivity coefficients for first quarter of each year class 
      1  5  9  13  17  21  25 
Purse seiners, all fleets  0.011  0.587  0.091  0.016  0.032  0.068  0.095 
Pole and line, all fleets    0.011  0.587  0.091  0.016  0.032  0.068  0.095 
                   
Longline, frozen and fresh, all fleets  0.008  0.104  0.825  0.999  0.987  0.981  0.981 